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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 18-2951
_____________
SNJEZANA JELACA BAGIC, DDS,
Appellant
v.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH;
BERNARD J. COSTELLO, DMD, MD, individually,
and in his official capacity as Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs
of the University of Pittsburgh School of Dental Medicine
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-18-cv-0511)
District Judge: Hon. Arthur J. Schwab
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 3, 2019
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 11, 2019)
_______________
OPINION
_______________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Snjezana Bagic appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her complaint under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 alleging ethnic discrimination. For the reasons that follow, we
will vacate and remand.
I.

BACKGROUND1
Beginning in 2008, Bagic was an instructor and faculty member at the University

of Pittsburgh’s School of Dental Medicine (the “University” or “Dental School”). Long
before that, in the early 1990s, she had fought in what she calls “the Patriotic War in
Croatia.” (App. at 79.) At some point after she began working at the University, she
came into conflict with her colleague Sean Noonan, an Assistant Professor at the Dental
School. Bagic became concerned that Noonan had been “abus[ing] his privileges as a
faculty member,” so, “on more than one occasion, [she] made complaints and/or
informed” her Department Chair about Noonan’s actions. (App. at 77-78.) Bagic also
personally raised her concerns with Noonan.
As a result of their dispute, “Noonan undertook a settled plan for the purpose of
discrediting Bagic and preventing [her] from interfering with his activities.” (App. at 78.)
To that end, “Noonan falsely stated to several University related individuals that Bagic
threatened to kill him.” (App. at 79.) Specifically, “Noonan alleged to University
personnel that Bagic [had] indicated [that] she had killed before in the war and would kill
The facts are based upon Bagic’s amended complaint, with all reasonable
inferences drawn in her favor. See Blanyar v. Genova Prods. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431 (3d
Cir. 2017) (“When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we ‘accept all factual allegations
as true, [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[.]’”
(citation omitted)).
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him.” (App. at 79.) And Noonan asked Bagic, in front of University faculty members, if
“she was armed[.]” (App. at 79 (quotation marks omitted).)
Noonan’s allegations resulted in an investigation, and another faculty member,
Bernard Costello, was tasked with investigating the alleged threats. According to Bagic,
however, Costello “undertook a biased investigation” “with a predetermined result.”
(App. at 79.) That bias was in part proven, she says, by handwritten notes from that
investigation showing an emphasis on her ethnicity and her time on “the front lines” of
the Croatian war. (App. at 81 (quotation marks omitted).) The investigation led to
Costello “falsely represent[ing] [to the University] that Bagic had admitted on several
occasions to threatening to kill Noonan[.]” (App. at 80.) Following the investigation, the
University terminated Bagic’s employment.
She then pursued an internal appeal. The hearing panel assigned to the appeal
recommended, and the University Chancellor found, that: (1) “[t]he information provided
by Costello to [the University] was not reliable;” (2) “Costello’s investigation was
flawed;” (3) “[t]he Dental School was unable to establish Bagic had threatened to kill
Noonan;” (4) “Bagic’s termination was unreasonable;” and (5) “Bagic’s alleged threats to
kill Noonan could not be substantiated.” (App. at 81.) Nonetheless, the University
refused to reinstate Bagic.
Bagic then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania, claiming that the University and Costello (the “Defendants”) discriminated
against her on the basis of her Croatian ethnicity, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
Defendants moved to dismiss Bagic’s claim and that motion was granted, but Bagic was
3

given leave to amend. She did so,2 and the Defendants again moved to dismiss.
Attached to that motion were excerpts from the University internal appeal proceeding and
Costello’s investigation. Based on those documents and the allegations in Bagic’s
complaint, the District Court concluded that Bagic had failed to adequately plead
discrimination based on her Croatian ethnicity, despite observing that it was “somewhat
unclear what the specific threat [made by Bagic] was” and that Costello’s references to
her time “‘on the front lines’ in the Croatian war seemingly would indicate a bias against
her on the basis of her ethnicity[.]” (App. at 8 n.2, 10 (citation omitted).)
Bagic timely appealed.
II.

DISCUSSION3
Invoking 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Bagic alleges that, based on Costello’s

biased investigation, the University terminated her employment because of her ethnicity.
To establish a right to relief, Bagic “must show … an intent to discriminate on the basis
of race by the defendant[.]”4 Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 569

2

In her amended complaint, Bagic made clear that her claims were under both 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
3

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review of a district
court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).” Blanyar, 861 F.3d at 431.
In all, Bagic “must show (1) that [s]he belongs to a racial minority;” (2)
discriminatory intent; “and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities
enumerated in § 1981, including the right to make and enforce contracts.” Pryor v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Ethnicity is covered by the category of race. See e.g., Fisher
v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (discussing equal protection claims,
4
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(3d Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But she is not required to
prove discriminatory intent at the motion to dismiss stage, rather she “need only put forth
allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [it].”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The District Court concluded that Bagic’s allegations were “wholly unsupported”
(App. at 8), and that she failed to “set forth sufficient allegations, beyond mere
conclusory and speculative statements, that her Croatian ethnicity was the basis for the
University’s actions.” (App. at 7.) But the pleadings and associated documents paint a
different picture, if viewed from Bagic’s perspective. It appears that, at the pleading
stage, enough has been alleged to raise a question of fact about the severity of her
supposed threat, and the District Court failed to draw reasonable inferences in her favor.
A.

The District Court Erred in Granting the University’s Motion to Dismiss

Bagic argues that the District Court, in granting the University’s motion to
dismiss, “improperly weighed evidence” and “ignored … evidence … that no threat ever
occurred.” (Opening Br. at 13.) We agree that the Court did not give her allegations
their due.
When considering a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “we must accept as true
all plausible facts alleged in [the plaintiff’s] complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
in her favor[,]” In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 131 (3d Cir.

“any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin
is inherently suspect” (citation omitted)).
5

2016), “constru[ing] the complaint in the light most favorable to [her.]” Blanyar v.
Genova Prod. Inc., 861 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotations
omitted); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (citation omitted)). A district court may not
“weigh[] the credibility of the parties’ positions on” “a question of disputed material
fact[]” at the motion to dismiss stage, but rather “should … le[ave] such considerations to
a jury.” Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 97 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, there was a question of fact pertaining to whether Bagic threatened
Noonan’s life. Based on certain excerpts from the record of the University’s internal
appeal,5 the District Court said that Bagic admitted to “Costello that she had threatened
her colleague.” (App. at 8.) We do not read the record that way, and perhaps the District
Court actually does not either, at least not that starkly. The Court acknowledged that,
after “[v]iewing this sworn testimony … in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it seems
there may have been a misunderstanding[,]” as Bagic “may have been trying to explain
that her ‘threat’ towards Dr. Noonan was [only] a threat to write a letter of complaint
about him.” (App. at 8 n.2 (emphasis added).) Nevertheless, despite it being “somewhat

Those excerpts were attached in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
were central to and referenced in Bagic’s complaint. Thus, the District Court did not err
in its consideration of those documents. See Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v.
John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A), 768 F.3d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[D]ocuments that
the defendant attaches to the motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if
they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the claim.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Bagic concedes that “the law clearly allows the
District Court to review th[o]se documents.” (Reply Br. at 3-4.)
5
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unclear what the specific threat was[,]” the Court concluded that it could not “find that
Dr. Costello’s actions in recommending the termination of Plaintiff’s contract were the
result of purposeful discrimination.” (App. at 8 n.2.) There are two problems with that
conclusion.
First, the resolution of “what the specific threat was” is a material question of fact
that should have prevented dismissal. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 97 (concluding that the
district court, on a motion to dismiss, improperly weighed the credibility of the parties’
positions on a disputed material fact); Marks v. CDW Comput. Ctrs., Inc., 122 F.3d 363,
367 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that whether plaintiffs had sufficient information to put them
on notice of their claims is a question of fact and is “often inappropriate for resolution on
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)”). The District Court explicitly noted the
ambiguity regarding the threat, but did not recognize its import. Bagic alleges that
Costello reported her statements as a legitimate threat against Noonan “solely based on
her Croatian nationality and background[,]” and that, upon learning of that allegation,
others at the University “would jump to the conclusion that as a Croatian, [she] would be
likely to harm a staff member[.]” (App. at 82.) Therefore, if the threat was indeed
falsely reported, its propagation throughout the University’s investigation and subsequent
appellate procedures raises a question of discriminatory intent. And, lest we forget, the
hearing panel on the University’s internal appeal recommended, and the Chancellor
found, that the existence of a death threat was unsubstantiated. The false accusation of a
death threat, exaggerated from a mere professional complaint, may be a symptom of deep
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animus based on Bagic’s ethnicity, and, depending on other evidence, could bolster
Bagic’s claim.
Second, to the extent there was ambiguity about the nature of Bagic’s threat, the
District Court was required to draw all inferences in her favor.6 Similarly, Costello’s
emphasis on Bagic’s time fighting in Croatia could lead to an inference in Bagic’s favor.
As the District Court said, the notes “seemingly would indicate a bias against her on the
basis of her ethnicity[.]” (App. at 10 (emphasis added).) At the pleading stage, she’s
entitled to the benefit of that inference. It was error for the Court to go on and say,
“viewed in context … the notes seem to merely be references to the actual subjects
discussed[.]”7 (App. at 10 (emphasis added).) When considering a motion to dismiss, a
district court cannot weigh competing inferences and forgo drawing a reasonable one in
the plaintiff’s favor.8

The complaint’s allegations regarding the University’s internal appeal findings
can support the conclusion that Bagic’s alleged threat was a permissible professional
complaint. For example, based on the University Hearing Panel’s findings, a fact-finder
in this case could conclude that: (1) Costello was unreliable; (2) “Bagic’s alleged threats
to kill Noonan could not be substantiated” and (3) that her “termination was
unreasonable[.]” (App. at 81.) Thus, after the University concluded that the alleged
threat to kill was unfounded – and the threat is alleged to be the only reason offered for
the termination – one might anticipate that Bagic would be reinstated. The University,
however, “refused to reinstate Bagic’s employment contract[.]” (App. at 81.) Again, at
the pleading stage, with all inferences drawn in her favor, Bagic can properly argue that
the stated reason was therefore not the real reason for her firing.
6

That context being solely the documents attached to the University’s motion to
dismiss. See supra note 5.
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Nothing in this opinion prevents the defendants from raising on remand
arguments about the reach of § 1983 or other arguments previously raised in the District
Court (see App. at 7 n.1, District Court Opinion (“Because the Court has found that
8

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand the District Court’s

dismissal of Bagic’s complaint.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of purposeful discrimination, the Court has not
considered the other arguments raised by Defendant regarding whether Dr. Costello is a
state actor and whether Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is time-barred.”)), and we imply
nothing about the merit any such arguments may have.
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